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Intresset för framsyn – olika sätt att föreställa sig, diskutera och forma framtiden – har vuxit 
snabbt de senaste decennierna. Diskussioner har förekommit i både privat och offentlig regi, 
ofta under rubriken teknisk framsyn. Icke desto mindre har diskussionerna ofta tenderat att 
driva iväg mot samhälleliga frågeställningar snarare än tekniska. De är nämligen lättare att 
förutse än de tekniska landvinningar som kan komma, men ännu inte börjat utvecklas. 
Prognoser för samhällelig förändring bör emellertid baseras på solida kunskaper om 
förändring och kontinuitet. Snart sagt ingenting kan sägas om framtiden utan att det relateras 
till gången tid; framsyn och framtidsstudier handlar om att avtäcka historiens puls. 
Prognoser om framtiden måste sålunda utgå ifrån samhällsvetenskaplig empirisk forskning.  
En viktig förklaringsfaktor till samhällelig förändring kan sökas i demografiska förändringar. 
Befolkningsutveckling är dessutom hyggligt förutsägbar och den ålderstransition som följer 
på den demografiska transitionen har stor betydelse för en lång rad socioekonomiska 
förändringar. Inte minst för glesbygdens framtid är den demografiska utvecklingen av 
avgörande betydelse. Där är åldersstrukturen ofta skev och flyttningsutbytet instabilt. Som en 
följd inställer sig både en rad politiska frågeställningar och utmaningar för 
glesbygdsforkningen.  
 
The last decades have seen a rapidly growing interest in foresight methodology. Methods 
have been developed in corporate and governmental communication exercises often labelled 
technology foresight. In reality, these foresights have often drifted into processes of social 
change, since technological change is hard to foresee beyond what is already in the pipe-line. 
Forecasting of social change, however, must be based on solid knowledge about the 
mechanisms of continuity and change. Virtually nothing can be said about the future without 
relating to the past; foresights and futures studies are about revealing the hidden pulse of 
history. Hence, the answer to forecasting the future is empirical research within the social 
sciences.  
Demographic change has been recognised as a key determinant for explaining social change. 
Population changes are fairly predictable and the age transition can explain a wide range of 
socio-economic changes. For rural futures, demographic change is a key issue, since age 
structure in rural areas is often uneven and also unstable due to migration patterns. A 
number of policy related questions as well as research challenges are raised as a 
consequence. 
 
 
  1From technology foresights to futures studies on social change 
In this paper we shall draw on some results from research carried out at the Institute for 
Futures Studies, Stockholm, during a five year research programme based on demography as 
a forecasting tool. Demography plays an increasingly important role in attempts to forecast 
social and economic development. Population changes are rather predictable and the age 
structure of a population has proved ability to explain a wide range of socio-economic 
changes (Lindh 2003; see also Godet 2000). The aim of this paper is to exploit demographic 
change in rural areas as a means to forecast their possible economic and social futures. The 
demographic situation in many rural regions is raising a number of policy related questions as 
well as research challenges.    
 
A common objection to demographically based prognoses is that they overlook two other 
central factors in social development, which are technological development and 
institutions/values such as laws, customs, religious traditions etc (Malmberg/Sommestad 
2000). One response to this objection is that, although these are important factors in long term 
social transformation they are of limited value in constructing meaningful long term 
prognoses since they are hard to predict.  
 
The increasing interest in the future development of society is obvious in both policy making 
and science. On a national basis most European countries are running initiatives like 
Technology Foresights, Forward Strategy Units etc. Many of these initiatives are building on 
a tradition stemming from military needs of forecasting technological change in order to be 
successful at war. Since the Second World War the methodology of technology foresights has 
been developing into the civil society in the industrialised world. Expert panels have been 
organised to communicate on technological change in order to foresee long term change.  
 
Also on a European level several initiatives have been taken during the last few years in order 
to strengthen a systematic building of knowledge on the possible futures of society. The EU 
has set up a Futures Programmes, Cost Action on Foresight Methodologies and quite a few of 
the various programmes for developing Europe aims at building knowledge on the long term 
development. Conferences on foresight and futures studies are frequently held. In some 
countries (e.g. Finland and Hungary) futures studies are taking the shape of a separate 
academic discipline with Master programmes etc.  
 
Many of these initiatives are broadening the field of foresight and futures studies. The 
limitations of the technology foresights have become obvious. Experiences from the last 
decade have revealed that technology breakthroughs cannot be forecasted over a longer 
period. First, technological innovations can not be forecasted until they are already in the 
pipe-line. This means that the foresight process will have to make the innovations in order to 
foresee them. Second, it is difficult to foresee with any certainty to what extent technological 
innovations will be implemented and their impact on society. Their use and their impact is 
depending on the development of the changing society in which the new technology will be 
introduced (Malmberg/Sommestad 2000.) Hence, the technology foresights have often drifted 
from focus on technology into foresights on the social and economic processes which they do 
not have the organisation or capacity to carry out (Westholm 2001.) Instead they often 
develop “stories on our own time” (Myrdal 2001; see also Cariola and Rolfo 2004), 
communication processes that circulates information that is already general understanding in 
contemporary society.  
 
  2Also institutional change has its limitations when it comes to long term prognoses. While the 
institutional theories to date have been able to reveal the stability of institutional structures, 
the path dependency, it is less developed when it comes to foresee trend shifts and the 
formative moments when institutional shifts are taking place.   
Focus on demography 
The use of demographics for forecasting is empowered by exploring the links between socio-
economic age dependent variables and the actual age structure in the past. In the long run and 
on a macro level this development takes the form of a demographic transition in which a 
country or a region goes from a situation with a high birth-rate and a high mortality rate to a 
low birth-rate and a low mortality. According to the UN (1998), five phases of age transition 
can be identified on a global scale. On the basis of the correlation between theses phases and 
economic growth, forecasts of economic growth have been made for all parts of the world  
(Lindh/Malmberg 2004) 
 
The demographic structure has proved to be a powerful tool for forecasting the future also in 
more specific contexts. The key factor to open this field has been the recognition of the age 
structure as a determinant of a number of socio-economic indicators. While an increasing 
share of the population being adults in working ages increases the productive capacity, a 
rising number of children and senior citizens expose the economy to economic stress. Going 
into details, every cohort has its own patterns of production and consumption and these 
patterns are in a general sense fairly stable and similar over time and also in various 
economies. Even if there are variations in the age of starting school, entering the labour 
market, moving away from home or retiring from work, over time and from one society to the 
other, a fundamental stability in the life cycle pattern remains (Malmberg/Sommestad 2000).   
 
Figure 1 shows the correlation between age structure and economic growth based on 
empirical data from 1950 to 1995 in Sweden.   
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Figure 1. The impact of age structure on the growth rate - an experience based model. 
Update from Lindh/Malmberg( 2000).  
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On a national level, the future cohort sizes can be predicted with a high degree of certainty 
decades into the future. Therefore, the demographic approach has its obvious advantages in 
efforts to foresee periods of heavy investments, of urban growth, of migration etc beyond the 
economic booms and recessions.  
 
In the last phase of the demographic transition, the aging phase, the heaviest population 
increase takes place in the oldest age groups while the share of the population being in the 
working ages declines. This is the situation that most of Europe is facing and which has been 
recognised as a major challenge for Europe during the coming decades. Many parts of rural 
Europe are in the forefront of this development and are already experiencing both population 
decline and a declining share of the population being in the working ages. The aging phase of 
the demographic transition in the rural periphery is the focus of this paper.  
Demography in rural studies   
So far, the presentation has been drawing on results from demographic studies on a national 
level. To what extent can the demographic transition be useful in a study of smaller regions or 
even rural areas within a country? Two important factors are changing with the geographical 
scale.  
 
1. While in a national forecast of the age structure, the estimated birth rate is the critical 
factor; migration may be of greater relevance in a “smaller” region (Rogerson 1997). The 
smaller the region that the analysis is confined to, the higher is the migration as a share of the 
population and therefore, the more important is in- and out-migration for the estimated future 
age structure. Also, as the migration is higher, demographic change may be quicker in smaller 
regions, both in absolute numbers and as variations between the cohorts. Therefore, migration 
is the vital factor to understand the future development both in declining rural areas and in 
rural areas where there is a net in-flux of migrants.  
 
2. The economy in a smaller (sub national) region is more integrated with the “outside” 
economy. The smaller the region is the more dependent on external factors is the regional 
economy. For instance, the welfare state re-distributes incomes between the regions in order 
to compensate for some of the effects of the age structure, for industrial decline etc. 
Therefore, the correlation between age structure and income may not reflect the conditions in 
that specific region.  
Population change in Sweden  
From these general observations we draw some conclusions relevant for our study on future 
population changes in rural regions. In Sweden, with a rather stable population of 9 million 
inhabitants, about 1.5% of the population changes every year through deaths, births and 
migration. Thus, to more than 98% the population consists of the same individuals from one 
year to another. Their sex and birth dates are fixed and their ageing is completely foreseeable. 
We also know the historical connections between age/sex and a number of human activities 
and, as we have argued, they are fairly stable. People tend to migrate, give birth and die at 
certain ages. By varying the assumptions regarding these factors it is possible to establish 
different scenarios. These simple facts are the basis also of traditional population forecasts. 
Such forecasts are carried out on a national basis as well as a regional and even at the local 
level. They are used for anything from estimating future tax rates or the need for housing to 
planning the extent and localisation of elderly care. In these cases the forecasts are often 
limited in time looking 5-6 years ahead.  
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The aim of our current research is to increase the knowledge on the crucial factors for the 
future settlement pattern in Sweden. In order to do that the methodological problems with 
long term demographic analyses for smaller areas has to be approached. Obviously, the 
prerequisites for population forecasts become poorer as the geographical resolution is 
increased and with a smaller study area a higher proportion of the inhabitants will be 
registered as migrants (let be internal) by definition. For example, at NUTS 3 level in Sweden 
– equal to the subdivision of this country into 21 “län” (“counties”) – the share of the 
population that changes from one year to another increase to 4%. In the following, we will 
present some population forecasts for a longer period and for even smaller areas, in this case 
Local Labour Markets (LA)
1, regions defined by commuting patterns. These can be described 
as functional regions for the every-day life of many individuals in which they have to find 
their job and must have access to every-day services. We will then discuss some policy 
implications of our results and also how to overcome the methodological weakness related to 
this kind of demographics.  
The 1990´s: a new wave of population concentration 
One of the problems in forecasting the regional population re-distribution for a smaller region 
is the unevenness in space and time of the process. A long term urbanisation and 
concentration is interrupted by periods of stability and periods of counter-urbanisation to 
some rural regions. After 25 years of relative regional stability the 1990s saw a new wave of 
population concentration in Sweden. During the second half of the decade more than 200 of 
the 290 communes had a population decline (Magnusson and Turner 2000). The city regions 
and their hinterlands grew quickly while rural and peripheral areas were generally worst off. 
The growing imbalances caused an increased interest in population forecasts both at the 
regional and the national level (e g Nygren and Persson 2000, Nygren and Persson 2001, 
Landstingsförbundet 2000). These forecasts had their focus longer into the future and they 
were national in the sense that the total sum of regional change was compatible with the 
national figures. The risk of over-optimism that has normally been reflected in locally and 
regionally produced scenarios had thus been reduced or at least controlled.  
 
The last few years the regional population redistribution has slowed down. In 2003 128 
communes lost population and 161 gained. These uneven waves of population change means 
that the forecasts come out very differently depending on which period that is chosen as the 
base-line.  
Regional forecast for 2025  
In the following section we present a simple population forecast from which we will discuss 
the research challenges raised by the methodological problems of uneven development and 
high shares of migration for the studied region. The data employed are based on the LAs and 
presents for each LA population, mean population, crude death rates and net migration rates 
2003 and 2004. Each sex and 1-year age group is separated. Fertility rate per female 1-year 
age group 2003 and 2004 is also included in the data.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Here the delimitation based on data from 1998, LA98,  have been employed. 
  5The years 2003 and 2004 were in a few decades perspective fairly normal in terms 
demographic standards. Fertility rates and migration risks have been calculated for every 
region separately, but for the calculations of death risks we have used larger regions. The 
reason for this is to avoid ending up with 0% death risks, a phenomenon caused by the fact 
that there are very few or no individuals in the oldest age/sex groups these years in some of 
the smallest LA. Thus, we have supplied every region with death risks based on the average 
death risk in its e-zone
2 on NUTS2
3 level. Thereby regard is paid both to geography and type 
of area. Note that the death risks are somewhat overestimated in the oldest age groups since 
there are no data for ages 100+. Thus, not a single individual is expected to become older than 
100 years.  
 
These data have been completed with assumptions concerning future changes in life 
expectancy and fertility as of Statistics Swedens national forecast (Statistics Sweden 2005). 
While there is an agreement among demographers that the life expectancy probably will 
increase in general, the extent of the increase and its regional variations are hazardous to 
estimate. Here, we have assumed that every region will have the same relative increase in life 
expectancy, setting out from their different figures 2003-2004 and modified as described 
above. The increase in fertility rate expected by Statistics Sweden is less certain. Since the all-
time-low 1999 at 1.5 the TFR have increased to 1.7, but the pace of the increase has slowed 
down considerably the last two years. From a theoretical point of view the hypothesis of a 
second demographic transition (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004) means that the long-term 
decrease in fertility may well keep on.  
 
However, in accordance with Statistics Swedens national forecast we assume a somewhat 
increasing life expectancy (2 years for women and 3 years for men) and total fertility rate (to 
1,85 children per woman) for every region. The assumed migration patterns on the other hand 
differs from Statistics Swedens national projection. While Statistics Sweden discuss the future 
situation in the world to motivate assumptions about future international migration patterns, 
our regional forecast is based entirely on the actual migration (national and international) 
2003-2004 in every region. These differences in presumptions mean that while Sweden would 
end up with 9,8 million inhabitants 2025 according to the national population projection 
carried out by Statistic Sweden but 9,9 million inhabitants according to the forecast employed 
here. 
 
The left map in Figure 2 illustrates the population change in Sweden’s 100 LA-regions from 
2004 to 2025 given our assumptions of changes in life expectancy and fertility and given that 
the regional populations beside that develop the same way they did in 2003-2004. To the right 
in figure 2 the migration has been excluded. The LAs are delimited in black. For the purpose 
of orientation, also commune borders are shown in the maps, in white. 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 Employment zones (Förvärvsregioner) are based on a clustering of local labour markets into groups consisting 
of similar properties regarding variables of importance for the functioning of the labour market; see Carlsson et 
al 1996.  
3 Equivalent to the regional subdivision of Sweden into eight “Riksområden”. 
  6Population change Population change Population change Population change Population change Population change Population change Population change Population change
2004-2025 2004-2025 2004-2025 2004-2025 2004-2025 2004-2025 2004-2025 2004-2025 2004-2025
Natural population Natural population Natural population Natural population Natural population Natural population Natural population Natural population Natural population
change 2004-2025 change 2004-2025 change 2004-2025 change 2004-2025 change 2004-2025 change 2004-2025 change 2004-2025 change 2004-2025 change 2004-2025
Population change (%)
10 to  24
0 to  10
-10 to  0
-40 to -10
 
Figure 2. Population change in Sweden 2003-2025 per Labour market Area (LA) Source: 
Data computed from Statistics Sweden 
 
The map to the left illustrates clearly a continued geographical concentration of the 
population. The large-city areas and a few university regions would obtain a growing 
population while the peripheral regions with few exceptions would suffer population loss. A 
cross-check with some alternative years as starting points reveals that the main trend is stable 
although the map varies to some extent when fertility rates, death and migration risks obtained 
other periods are employed. They all point at a continued concentration and a substantial 
population decrease in rural/peripheral LAs. 
 
Indeed, there is nothing new about this. It is a tendency that could be observed decades ago. 
But what is new is the magnitude of the population decrease in the worst affected LAs. While 
the 10 weakest LAs 1984-2004 lost 22% of their population during that period of time, their 
  7equivalents in the coming 20 years will lose 32% of their population, given our assumptions. 
Thus, the population decrease in the declining regions is expected to speed up, and – as the 
map hint at – most of the affected LAs are to be found in the sparsely populated areas in the 
northern inland. 
 
However, the LAs showing most improved population development in the coming decades do 
not belong to the top 10 of the growth list. Rather, they can be found in the middle part of it, 
and either their population decrease can be expected to diminish or their population increase 
can be expected to be enhanced.  
 
The map to the right which shows the population forecast without migration serves just 
analytical purposes. It illustrates what would happen if no migration at all would occur. As 
can be seen, the net population growth would be reduced considerably, were it not for the 
migration. In sum, the population would only grow marginally, from 9,0 to 9,2 million 
inhabitants. Even worse, this natural growth is generated by increased life expectancy rather 
than fertility; as the fertility rate is assumed to stay well below the 2,1 children per woman 
needed for long time reproduction of the population throughout the period.  
 
In terms of geographical range, the natural growth is limited to about one third of the regions, 
mainly in the denser populated southern parts of the country. This is not primarily an effect of 
varying fertility or death rates. Actually the highest fertility rates in the country are found in 
Tornedalen – along the Finnish border in the far north and the life expectancy does not show 
enough geographical variations to supply an explanation for the pattern revealed in the map. 
Instead the map reflects variations in the regional age structures. The regions centered around 
big cities and university locations take the demographic advantages of a young population 
which means high birth rates and low death rates while the situation is reversed in the 
peripheral regions. In contrast to other factors influencing the population change, certainly 
migration components, the age structure tends to be stable, which makes the situation in the 
periphery certainly problematic. The age structure is in turn – of course – consequences of 
earlier migration which has tended to geographically concentrate the population.    
 
Thus, 2/3 of the LAs are dependent on net in-migration just to keep the population constant. 
By comparing the two ways we can see that – given the assumptions – this will in fact be the 
case in a number of LAs with natural population decrease, but far from all. Certainly in the 
northern inland both a negative natural population change and a net out migration can be 
expected to contribute to the decreasing populations. So far we have noted that – given our 
assumptions – the population growth will continue at a slow pace. The tendency to 
geographical concentration will persist too, but it will change to the advantage of LAs with an 
average population change at the cost of the ones worst affected by population decrease. This 
means that a number of peripheral LAs would lose more than 30% (in some cases close to 
40%) of their population in the coming 20 years. 
 
In sum, most regions (and certainly the rural/peripheral), and in the longer run also the 
country as a whole, are dependent on net in-migration to balance the natural population loss. 
Sweden and its regions have passed all the way through the demographic transition and in the 
case of the rural/peripheral regions the ageing has been reinforced by decades of (out) 
migration. The fertility rate is well below replacement level while the big cohorts from the 
early 1940´s are getting old and thereby increase the death rates in decades to come. Many 
rural regions are entering an age structure which could be described as a phase of advanced 
ageing, with a connected natural population decline, often combined with net out-migration. 
  8Population in growth and decline 
Population pyramids are an often used and effective means to illustrate the age and sex 
structure of a population. These structures are of importance not only from a demographic 
point of view. As we have argued, a changing age structure has consequences for the society 
at large too. Here we present population pyramids for three different LAs in Sweden. 
Göteborg LA is the second largest in Sweden and represent a growing city region. Falun-
Borlänge LA is of medium-size and represents an average LA. Finally Övertorneå LA 
represents a peripheral region with a declining population. The LAs 2025 are estimated as in 
previous national forecast with 2003 as a model year from which we repeat the migration 
pattern, fertility rate and death rate in the model.  
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Figure 3. Population pyramid for a growing LA 2003 and 2025. Source: Data computed from 
Statistics Sweden 
 
Göteborg LA is growing from 886 000 inhabitants 2003 to 1 040 000 inhabitants 2025. From 
the 2003 pyramid the large cohorts born during the 1940s, 1960s and around 1990 are 
apparent. The latter cohort is even more marked in the 2025 pyramid as a lot of its individuals 
are expected to move to Gothenburg (and the two other large city regions in the country). 
Women tend to migrate when they are younger than men, and are therefore slightly 
overrepresented in the population of Götegorg LA compared to Sweden as a whole. However, 
the sex structure would be more balanced 2025 compared to 2003 according to the forecast. 
Following the in-migration of young adults, a new baby-boom can be expected around 2020. 
The cohorts born during the 1940s and 1960s are less sharp 2025 as they are expected to 
decrease their presence in the LA following death risks and net out-migration in ages over 50.  
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Figure 4. Population pyramid for an average LA 2003 and 2025. Source: Data computed 
from Statistics Sweden 
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Falun-Borlänge LA had 149 000 inhabitants 2003. The population is expected to be slightly 
smaller in 2025, but older. The average age is expected to rise from 41 to 44. From the 
population pyramid 2003, the large cohorts can be identified again. In 2025, the two older 
large cohorts are still marked, although reduced, mainly due to death risks increasing with 
age. Many from the big cohorts around 1990 have left the region and moved elsewhere. Thus, 
the small children are rather few, and the baby-boom that was foreseen in the Göteborg case 
can hardly be noticed here. On the other hand Falun-Borlänge LA appears to have a net in-
migration of children. The sex structure is essentially balanced although men are slightly 
overrepresented. Here we find hardly any differences in migration patterns between men and 
women.  
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Figure 5. Population pyramid for a declining LA 2003 and 2025. Source: Data computed 
from Statistics Sweden 
 
Övertorneå LA, in the far north, is sparsely populated at 1.4 inhabitants per square kilometre 
2003. (This can be compared to a sparsely populated area in continental Europe like Auvergne 
at 50; the EU average is 120 inhabitants per square kilometre.) Övertorneå LA has 5 500 
inhabitants 2003 and is expected to have 3 500 inhabitants 2025. Once again the large cohorts 
can be seen in the 2003 pyramid. Note the uneven sex structure with men dominating in all 
the younger and middle aged cohorts. Although the 1960s cohort is not as large as elsewhere, 
the baby-boom of 1990 is apparent. This area has in fact the highest fertility rate in Sweden.  
 
However, a glance at the pyramid of 2025 is startling. Via an hourglass-shaped pyramid 
around 2015 we end up with a mushroom-shape 2025. Very few young people remain. The 
older cohorts are reduced in number too, but not at all to the same extent as the young. The 
average age is expected to rise from 45 years to 55. Of the total population 45% will be 65+ 
years and 13% will be 0-19. Besides the remarkable age structure, the sex structure is also 
extremely uneven with a marked male surplus in all the productive ages. A large share of each 
generation of women in ages 18-24 tends to leave the small local labour market areas in 
northern Sweden. In the ages 25-35, women show a net in-migration, although of a smaller 
magnitude. The male net out-migration is of a smaller extent and is distributed over the whole 
migration-intensive period in the life cycle (ages 18-35). A minor male net in-migration can 
be noticed around retirement age. In this case Övertorneå ends up at a 55% male population 
2025 (52% in 2003). In ages 15-39 the proportion of men would amount to 68% according to 
this model (55% in 2003).  
 
  10Increased fertility can do little to change the mushroom-shape to the right into a pyramid as 
there are relatively few women in fertile ages already today. The low potential of birth rates is 
resulting from decades of out migration of young adults giving the area an age structure 
unfavourable for natural population growth. The ageing in years to come is reinforced by 
expected continuing out migration of young adults. The key factor to understand this case is 
migration, but the driving forces for their migration are manifold and labour market-related 
objectives is only a minor explanation (Garvill m fl 2000). Rather, the rural periphery seems 
to become an environment with less attraction on the young generation. The latter is 
confirmed by the limited effect campaigns trying to attract young families to a few communes 
in the north with free housing and child-care have had.   
 
Although migration is the key determinant for the future population in this region it is obvious 
that not even a substantial in-flux of young people would be sufficient to avoid the declining 
and aging figures. It seems that Övertorneå has reached the advanced ageing phase, a situation 
in which population decline seems unavoidable in a few decades future.  
 
Now we hope to have given a picture of the age and sex distribution in three labour market 
areas. Although they represent three different patterns there might be of interest to see the 
whole picture. To be able to give that the age structure is represented by the dependency rate 
(rate of 0-17 and 65+ years) in figure 6.  
 
Fertility below reproduction rate (2.1 children per woman) as such contributes to an aging of 
the Swedish population. Increased life expectancy works in the same direction. However it is 
clear from the three population pyramids that aging has its own geography too. While 
Gothenburg LA is hardly affected at all, almost only retired people seem to be left in 
Övertorneå LA. Falun-Borlänge LA is somewhere in between. However, there are 97 other 
LAs in Sweden. Figure 6 illustrate their shares of population in dependent (not included in the 
work-force) ages in 2004 and 2025, respectively.  
 
The first impression of the pair of maps is the darker shades in general 2025 compared to 
2004 indicating a general aging population. The dependency rate in the total population of 
Sweden would increase from 42% to 48% during the 21 year period. Nonetheless, there are a 
few exceptions (among them Gothenburg LA) and a number of LAs with rather modest 
change. This means that there are other areas the more concerned. Many LAs obviously run 
the risk of a shock of aging beside the sharp population decline which often awaits them. 
Most of them are to be found in the northern inland. In Jokkmokk LA for example, the 
dependency rate 2004 was 42%, close to the national average. In 2025 we have calculated it 
to have increased 14 percentage points to 56%. During the same time this LA would have lost 
one third of its population, according to the forecast. But we need not go to the far north to 
find this kind of LAs. Lysekil LA, on the western coast, provide an example too. The 
dependency ratio would, according to our forecast, increase from almost average 42% 2004 to 
53% in 2025, and the population would decrease with 11%.     
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Figure 6. Dependency rate2004 and 2025 per Labour market Area (LA). Source: Data 
computed from Statistics Sweden 
 
Table 1 summarise the most important features of the population forecast. It shows the 
population development and changes in the dependency rate for the ten fastest decreasing LAs 
2005-2025 – according to the forecast. For purposes of comparison, the corresponding data 
for the period 1984-2004 and the national figures are also presented.   
 
LA  Population development  Dep rate start  Dep rate end 
10 most decreasing LAs 1984-2004  -21,1%  43%  44% 
10 most decreasing LAs 2005-2025  -32,4%  45%  56% 
Sweden 1984-2004  +8,0%  39%  38% 
Sweden 2005-2025  +10,3%  38%  43% 
 
Table 1 Population development 1984-2004 and 2005-2025 (forecast) and dependency rates 
in the 10 most decreasing LAs and in Sweden. 
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From Table 1, a few things are clear. Firstly, in the coming 20 years the population of Sweden 
will continue to grow – given our assumptions – at a rate similar to the growth in the past 20 
years. However, the population is ageing and – as a consequence – the dependency rate can be 
expected to increase. The tendency towards a lower dependency rate which could be noticed 
for the period 1984-2004 would reverse. Secondly, in regional terms the changes may be 
more extensive, certainly when it comes to the weakest LAs. Although the tendencies towards 
declining populations and heightened dependency rates are not new, the magnitude of these 
developments will increase. Compared to the development in the weakest LAs during the past 
20 years, the population decrease would speed up considerably in the coming 20 years and 
may be accompanied by a shock of aging as the dependency rate increase from 45% to 56%. 
This could become very problematic on the local level, but as the populations in the affected 
LAs tend to be small it is a problem of uneven development rather than a strain on the 
national level. However, the other side of this coin can be noticed as a slightly better 
development for LAs close to average population change.   
Methodological challenges 
The method we use in order to forecast the age structure is fairly traditional in the sense that it 
is built on an extension in time of today’s pattern. The uncertainty of such forecasts is often 
handled by the means of stochastic prognoses or the carrying out of several alternative 
forecasts. However, also the in-data to these stochastic or alternative forecasts are based on 
the uncertainties that uneven migration patterns causes.  
 
These population forecasts have also been criticised for their deterministic approach; that they 
fail to foresee trend shifts or take into account possible actions taken to avoid negative 
scenarios from becoming reality. As the comics Dilbert states: “the problem with dystopias is 
that there is always someone there to avoid them coming true”.  
 
The conclusion we draw from our last case, the rural/peripheral region Övertorneå, is 
precisely that: Övertorneå will not develop the age structure in 20 years time that our model 
forecast is predicting. Neither the local economy, nor the labour market or vital service 
functions, as for instance the elderly care, would sustain the pressure from a population where 
the retired is in such a vast majority. Before the local labour market reaches the phase of such 
an advanced ageing a number of mechanisms would alter the course of events. 
 
The situation is similar to the one which sometimes has been described as a “system flip” in 
natural ecological systems. The “flip” is the transition from one quasi-stable condition to 
another. The term is used for instance in water environments that are exposed to heavy nitrate 
deposit which at a certain point turn the system in an irreversible way. In Övertorneå the 
“demographic flip” could mean a transition into a situation where a balanced population can 
not be established within reasonable time and where the situation calls for major restructuring 
of the society in order to fulfil basic needs for its inhabitants. The “demographic flip” in 
Övertorneå means that we must expect a trend shift. 
  
Having dismissed our own forecast, the research challenge is to develop the method so that 
we can foresee the adaptive steps that leads away from our prognosticated future; that is how 
will the trend sift that seems unavoidable appear? As migration is already identified as the 
crucial factor in analysis on this geographic scale we must find ways for early detection of 
shifts in migration patterns also for a delimited region such as the local labour market 
(Övertorneå LA).  
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A first step is to go beyond the sex/age distribution and look at the migration pattern in 
various sub-groups of the population. A number of studies on contemporary migration have 
already opened this research field (Amcoff 2003, AMS 1999; Garvill et al 2000, Nordiska 
rådet 2002). In a study in progress we are looking at how the migration pattern is correlated to 
income, education, ethnic back-ground, prosperity, household composition etc. The aim is to 
separate changing patterns within each sub-group from changes caused by variations in the 
size of the sub-group. This would open up for more detailed and reliable forecasts of the 
future population re-distribution.  
 
A second step is to deepen the analysis on the purpose of migration. Such an objective also 
draws attention to the importance of the appropriate geographical scale of analysis. Although 
this is not at all a new issue (e g Rogerson 1997) it is too often ignored. Traditionally it has 
been taken for granted that migration is a function of labour-market related factors. Thus the 
LAs (Labour market Regions) have been the appropriate spatial level to study. The motives of 
migrants have been thoroughly studied in Sweden in recent years, again as a consequence of 
the increasing migration in the 1990s. Although a migrant is defined as someone who has 
moved from one geographical LA to another, surprisingly few (generally 20-30% of 
respondents) refers to labour market related factors to motivate and explain their move (e.i 
Garvill et al 2000, Nordiska rådet 2002, Amcoff 2000). Register data support these studies 
showing that only 35% of movers also change their job (Johansson et al 2004). The traditional 
correlation between vacant posts/employments and migration is becoming less pronounced 
(AMS 1999). Increased commuting and IT-technology have added to a spatial separation 
between job and place to live. Therefore, when choosing the level of the analysis, it is 
increasingly necessary to consider the actual choices that people make (Amcoff 2003).  
 
As the most frequent incentive to move relates to an attraction to a certain living milieu, the 
driving force is place-based rather than related to the labour market regions. These migration 
patterns can only be interpreted on data revealing the specific place based conditions. 
Therefore, our aim is to study migration on data for smaller areas, in reality on village or 
residential area level. The reason to regard this geographical question important is the 
awareness that the composition of living milieus varies a lot between the different LAs.  
 
Obviously, not only the housing preferences but also the possibility to achieve them varies 
between the socio-economic sub-groups. Besides that, the motives and drivers may change 
over time and each of the sub-groups will change its relative size over time. In Sweden data is 
available on a high geographical resolution on the migration patterns for different sub-groups. 
By the employment of GIS (Geographical Information System) such data can be used to 
monitor migration and population development at any geographical scale, but still paying 
attention to the importance of geographical scale in the analysis. Our aim is also to increase 
the possibility to detect trend shifts (early warnings). In the end we are aiming at giving a 
better empirically grounded picture of the possible settlement pattern in Sweden a few 
decades ahead.   
Political implications 
The forecasted age structure in peripheral rural regions is also raising a number of policy 
related questions. The current Swedish regional policy has the main objective to facilitate 
“growth and development in all Labour market Areas (LAs) in Sweden. Whether “growth” is 
defined as population growth or as GDP growth it seems to be an unlikely scenario in these 
regions.  
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To the opposite, the mushroom shape of the population pyramid indicates that the numbers of 
adults in working ages will be far from enough to compensate for the increasing numbers of 
retirees. Figure 6 points at this problem as a public sector dilemma. In general terms the 
public sector can be described as a mechanism for the re-distribution of incomes between 
ages. Generally, the childhood and the time after the working ages are periods when we have 
to be taken care of while the working age is mainly producing the surplus to distribute to other 
ages.  
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Fig 7. Public consumption and transfers per capita distributed on age groups 1998 (Nordén 
and Olsson 2000) . Personal tax payed distributed on ages groups from the Swedish income 
panel 1997 (Johansson, 2002).  
 
The high degree of transfers and consumption of public services needed to the oldest cohorts 
indicate the public sector dilemma that Övertorneå (and many rural regions in Sweden) is 
facing. The relatively few young people expected to remain in the area add to the problem. 
The declining tax-base will call for growing re-distribution of tax payer’s money from the 
growing city regions to make possible for the local authorities to offer elderly care on today’s 
standard. Also the health care system, today founded on county level, will have to negotiate 
resources needed to be transferred from other regions (Westholm 2004.) So, from an 
economic point of view, the uneven age structure is a problem of both spatial and generational 
re-distribution.   
 
What may make the situation even more critical though, is the forecasted labour deficit. It 
appears that many peripheral rural regions (among them Övertorneå) will have a labour force 
too small even to handle the basic public services as they are organised today (Nygren and 
Persson 2001). A diversified and well-functioning labour market is hard to imagine in this 
kind of economy.  
 
  15The age structure in Övertorneå is in a European comparison extreme. Still it provides an 
example of problems that most of Europe is facing in a few decades time. At a national level a 
few Mediterranean countries including Italy are among the most affected. Golini (2001) have 
pointed at a number of measures to increase the fertility rate and thereby counter the 
tendencies to aging and finally population decrease. However, it should be noticed that in this 
respect the causes of this demographic situation is different in the areas focused here. It is not 
primarily a low TFR that is causing the aging and population decrease in areas like the inland 
of northern Sweden. In fact, the TFR in Övertorneå LA is among the highest in the country.  
 
The problem is that the young people are leaving and have done so for a long time. In theory, 
measures to change the migration could seem to be the right cure here, but given the insights 
referred to above, that migration to a larger and larger extent is driven by factors related to the 
living milieu and other factors not directly related to the labour market, it is hard to see how 
this could be done. Rather, these obvious problems may trigger others: they may even develop 
a circle of quicker decline as young adults choose to leave the area rather than face the 
problems decline. Another possibility is that the situation will initiate an exodus of old people, 
either as a consequence of a re-organisation of services or as an “escape” to relatives in other 
parts of the country.   
 
A third possible solution to the foreseen problems with labour supply is some kind of 
commuting into the area or a fly in – fly out-solution. The deficit can also cause an increased 
immigration from other countries. The fact that the surrounding labour markets are seeing the 
same problems indicate that any solution to the problem must be some kind of long distance 
relations; recruitment of foreign labour, long distance migration etc.   
 
Today, these problems are only emerging and still it is hard to foresee the adaptation 
strategies that will be implemented on various political levels and/or in the private and the 
voluntary sectors. How can the public services be re-organised in a resource effective way 
without putting the quality at risk?    
 
As the countries and regions of the world pass through the phases of the demographic 
transition their populations will experience an age transition. First in line on a national level 
of scale are some European countries, but finally the whole population of the earth will 
experience aging and maybe even a population implosion (Yea 2004). The peripheral rural 
areas of Europe will experience these problems earliest and in a more extreme way and the 
solutions/adaptations that will be introduced may provide models of the welfare mechanisms 
as well as new ways of commercial and public service provision.    
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